Abraham Neyman - Selected Publications#

Neyman A. Singular Games have Asymptotic Values. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1981;6:205-212.

Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games. International Journal of Game Theory. 1981;10:53-66.

Neyman A, Dubey P, Weber RJ. Value Theory without Efficiency. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1981;6:122-128.

Mertens JF, Neyman A. Stochastic Games have a Value. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 1982;79:2145-2146.

Neyman A. Bounded Complexity Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Economic Letters. 1985;19:227-229.

Aumann RJ, Kurz M, Neyman A. Power and Public Goods. Journal of Economic Theory. 1987;42:108-127.

Neyman A. Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata. Mathematics of Operations Research. 1998;23:513-552.

Neyman A. Cooperation in Repeated Games when the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known. Econometrica. 1999;67:45-64.

Neyman A, Gossner O, Hernandez P. Optimal Use of Communication Resources. Econometrica. 2006 :1603 - 1636.

Kohlberg E, Neyman A. Games of Threats. Games and Economic Behavior 2018;108:139-145.